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Executive Summary 
 
This paper reviews labor-market performance of Denmark and Germany during the Great 
Recession. From the mid-1990s through the onset of the Great Recession, Denmark had what were 
arguably the most successful labor-market outcomes in the OECD, but the country has suffered in 
recent years.   Germany, on the other hand, struggled with high unemployment, slow job growth, 
and rising wage inequality through much of the period between unification and the onset of the 
Great Recession, but has outperformed the rest of the OECD since. Labor-market institutions may 
explain the different experiences of the two economies. Danish institutions – built around 
numerically flexible employment levels and strong income security for workers – appear to perform 
well when the economy is at or near full employment. In good times, the country’s expensive active 
labor market policies work to connect unemployed workers to available jobs. In a severe downturn, 
however, where the overwhelming cause of unemployment is a lack of aggregate demand, 
institutions that encourage adjustment through employment are a liability and policies that seek to 
“activate” workers are not particularly effective. German labor-market institutions, which emphasize 
job security by keeping workers connected to their current employers, may have drawbacks when 
the economy is operating near full employment because they may discourage the efficient 
reallocation of workers from firms and industries where demand is falling to firms and industries 
where demand is on the rise. These same institutions, however, appear to have been well-suited for 
coping with the Great Recession because they encouraged firms to cut hours rather than workers, 
sharing the burden of the downturn more widely and helping firms keep their workforce in place 
and ready for the subsequent upturn. 
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Introduction 
 
The Great Recession has produced the worst and most sustained labor-market outcomes that the 
United States has experienced since the Great Depression. At its peak, 15 million people were 
unemployed by the official count, and about 25 million were underemployed by a broader definition 
that includes those who are working part-time because they can’t find full-time work or who have 
given up on finding a job altogether. US economic policy makers responded to the downturn with a 
mix of macroeconomic and labor-market policies that certainly reduced the severity and the duration 
of the devastation.  Nevertheless, almost two full years into the official recovery, job creation is 
anemic and unemployment and underemployment remain at staggering levels. 
 
The Great Recession started in the United States, but it quickly spread to the rest of the world. Some 
countries fared even worse than the United States. Many, though, seem to have weathered the crisis 
better. This paper reviews the experience of 21 rich countries that are all members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – a group of economies that 
offer a standard of living roughly comparable to that of the United States – in search of possible 
lessons for the United States. 
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage-point change between 2007 and 2009 in the unemployment rate 
across these 21 rich countries. Since national definitions of the unemployment rate vary somewhat, 
the figure uses “harmonized” unemployment rates prepared by the OECD. The figure covers a 
period that starts in 2007 – the year just before the downturn hit most economies – and ends in 
2009 – the year that the economy reached its trough in most countries.1 After Spain (9.7 percentage 
points) and Ireland (7.2 percentage points), the United States had the third highest increase in 
unemployment (4.7 percentage points). In the other OECD economies, the increase in 
unemployment was less than 2.5 percentage points. Strikingly, the unemployment rate actually fell in 
Germany (-1.2 percentage points). 
 
Economic theory suggests three possible reasons for the different unemployment experience. The 
first is that the size of the negative demand shock might have varied across these economies. It 
could be, for example, that Spain suffered a larger negative demand shock than the United States, 
which in turn experienced a worse demand shock than most of the rest of the OECD. Since we 
can’t directly observe demand shocks, we can never be completely sure. But, all of the evidence – 
primarily the change in gross domestic product (GDP) – suggests that the demand shocks were large 
and negative across all of these economies. The shock to Germany, for example, was likely larger 
than the one that hit the United States: between 2007 and 2009, German GDP fell 3.8 percent, 
compared to a 2.6 percent decline in the United States.2 
                                                 
1 The National Bureau of Economic Research marks the beginning of the recession in the United States at December 
2007, with the trough in June 2009. The downturn generally hit the rest of the world later, in 2008. For a nice summary 
of the timing of the recession in European economies, see Cameron (2010), Table 2. 
2 The German economy was particularly vulnerable to the Great Recession because world trade collapsed in the 
downturn and exports are such an important part of the German economy. The main source of the shock in the 
United States was the collapse in the residential housing market. Construction and real-estate-related employment 
plummeted, but the main blow came through the (still not quite complete) deflation of the housing bubble, which 
greatly reduced household net worth and induced a severe contraction in spending. See, for example, Baker (2009a) 
and Bivens (2011). 
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FIGURE 1 
Change in Harmonized Unemployment Rate, 2007-2009 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
A second possible explanation for the different unemployment experiences are different 
macroeconomic policy responses. Even if all countries experienced exactly the same negative 
demand shock, counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy – expansionary monetary and fiscal policy – 
could have reduced the observed decline in GDP more in some countries than in others. 
Macroeconomic policy responses did vary widely across the OECD, but most analyses of 
macroeconomic policy suggest that the United States did better than average.3 The Federal Reserve 
Board lowered interest rates farther and faster in the United States than, for example, the European 
Central Bank did in Europe.4 The United States also implemented the largest explicit fiscal stimulus 
package (as a share of GDP) among the major OECD countries. Other countries passed smaller 
stimulus packages, and automatic stabilizers were more important parts of the fiscal response 
elsewhere, but, even taking all these measures into account, the fiscal response was likely faster and 
larger in the United States. 
 
                                                 
3 See, for example, OECD (2009) and ILO (2009). For a dissenting view on comparative fiscal policy, see Aizenman and 
Paricha (2011), but note that their definition of fiscal stimulus is narrow, excluding tax cuts and increases in 
unemployment benefits, for example.. 
4 For a nice illustration of key interest rates across a sample of the major OECD economies, see ILO (2011), Figure 2.2. 
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A final possible explanation for the different international unemployment experience in the 
downturn is the structure of labor markets. National labor-market institutions likely vary in the way 
that they translate a given decline in GDP into unemployment. The preceding discussion suggests 
that the United States experienced a negative demand shock somewhere in the middle of the OECD 
experience and responded in a way that partly mitigated the negative impact of that shock. If so, the 
large rise in US unemployment suggests that US labor-market institutions offered a particularly 
harsh trade-off between falling GDP and unemployment. By contrast, Germany appears to have 
experienced a larger negative demand shock and to have responded to that shock with less 
aggressive monetary and fiscal policy than the United States, yet unemployment declined in Germany 
between 2007 and 2009. The German labor-market institutions appear to have handled the demand 
shock extremely well. 
 
This paper will focus on this third possible reason for international differences in the labor-market 
response to the Great Recession: national labor-market institutions. The second section of the paper 
presents a brief framework for thinking about how labor-market institutions and polices mediate the 
relationship between GDP and employment. The third section reviews the experience of two 
national economies: Denmark, which operated what was arguably the most successful labor market 
of the 2000s, and Germany, which has had remarkable success in resisting the international rise in 
unemployment since 2007. The final section concludes with some possible lessons for the United 
States.  
 
 
Labor Markets and Macroeconomic Shocks 
 
Once a negative demand shock has hit and macroeconomic policy has been deployed in response, 
the path of employment and unemployment depends largely on the labor market. For the 21 rich 
OECD countries, Figure 2 graphs the change between 2007 and 2009 in the unemployment rate 
against the corresponding change in real GDP. Over this two-year period, real GDP fell in every 
country except Austria. 
 
The figure includes a regression line that traces the average relationship between unemployment and 
GDP across the countries. Most of the countries in the sample (including Denmark) are clustered 
close to the average experience. These data suggests that the national labor-market institutions in 
place in these countries converted a one percentage-point decline in GDP into about a 0.4 
percentage-point increase in unemployment. Several of the countries, however, lie well off the line, 
indicating that they differ substantially from the OECD average. Germany, for example, falls well 
below the regression line. Any given decline in German GDP had far less impact on the 
unemployment rate than at the OECD average. The United States, Spain, and Ireland, meanwhile, 
all lie well above the regression line, suggesting that GDP declines in these countries are much more 
costly in terms of unemployment than was the case for the OECD in general. 
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FIGURE 2 
Unemployment and GDP, 2007-2009 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD and Conference Board data 
 
 
In broad terms, labor markets can adjust to macroeconomic demand shocks in some combination of 
three ways (with an important caveat, which will follow). Either employment can fall: fewer workers 
working the same number of hours as before (at the same hourly wage) meet the new lower output 
demanded. Or average hours per worker can fall: the same number of workers spend fewer hours 
per week to produce the new output level.5 
 
Imagine that a particular decline in aggregate demand requires that employers reduce their total wage 
bill by ten percent. The wage bill (B) is equal to the total number of employees (E), times the 
average number of hours they work (H/E), times the average hourly wage (W): 
 
B = E * (H/E) * W 
 
Employers could cut the wage bill by reducing employment by ten percent (E), or by reducing the 
average hours per worker (H/E) by ten percent (or, of course, by some combination of the two). As 
the discussion below will suggest, labor-market institutions play a crucial role in determining exactly 
where the adjustment falls. In Denmark, the United States, and most other countries in the OECD, 
                                                 
5 A third possibility is that total employment and average hours remain constant, but the hourly wage falls. Assuming 
that average productivity remains constant, however, the wage cut alone doesn’t lower output to match the new lower 
level of demand facing the firm. 
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much of the adjustment has fallen on employment (E), resulting in substantial increases in 
unemployment. In Germany, essentially all of adjustment has occurred through changes in average 
hours (H/E), resulting in a counter-intuitive decline in unemployment there. 
 
One caveat applies, however. These adjustment mechanisms are incomplete on their own. One of 
the central insights of Keynes’s General Theory was that cuts in workers’ incomes, whatever form they 
take, cannot restore full employment in the face of a shortfall in aggregate demand. The very action 
of individual employers cutting workers take-home pay in order to bring their individual wage bills 
into line with the lower level of aggregate demand has the effect of further lowering aggregate 
demand. Labor-market adjustments take place, but in the middle of an aggregate demand slump, 
they cannot restore full employment without offsetting expansionary macroeconomic policy or 
some new, positive, aggregate demand shock. This new, positive demand shock could take many 
forms, some of which are more desirable than others. The short US recession of 2001, for example, 
ended primarily because of demand fueled by the housing bubble. Economists have long argued, 
however, that wage-led growth offers a more sustainable avenue for reviving and maintaining 
aggregate demand.6 
 
 
The Great Recession in Denmark and Germany 
 
Labor-market institutions have been at the center of the discussion of labor-market performance 
since at least the 1980s, when unemployment rose sharply and remained stubbornly high in most of 
the major OECD economies. A standard view, encapsulated in the OECD’s 1994 Jobs Study, 
maintains that labor-market institutions are the primary determinant of labor-market performance. 
In this framework, labor-market institutions should first and foremost seek to maximize “flexibility”; 
other economic and social goals of labor-market institutions – including economic security and 
equity – are distinctly secondary. This view generally leaves aside the role that macroeconomic policy 
plays in the smooth functioning of the labor market. To the extent that this approach does 
acknowledge the importance of macroeconomics, it is usually to argue that institutions such as 
unions, unemployment insurance, and employment protection legislation restrict the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policy by introducing “rigidities” that channel expansionary policies toward 
inflation, not job creation.7 
 
In the mid-2000s, this standard view was updated and amended8 in the face of substantial evidence 
that countries with what qualified as “rigid” labor markets by many of the usual indicators (high 
union coverage rates, generous unemployment benefits, strong employment protection legislation, 
and others) were performing quite well. This new thinking brought explicit recognition to two key 
ideas. The first was that the previous understanding of flexibility was too narrow. Unemployment 
insurance, for example, might reduce incentives for the unemployed to accept jobs, but these same 
benefits might improve the quality of eventual job matches by giving workers more time to search. 
A second key idea was that the interaction of labor-market institutions matters more than the 
                                                 
6    See Kalecki (1991), Berg and Ostry (2011), Coates (2011), and Palley (2011). 
7 For a summary of the debate and a critique of the orthodox view, see, among many others: Howell (2005), Schmitt 
and Wadsworth (2005), and Baccaro and Rei (2007).  
8 For a succinct summary of the amended thinking, see OECD, 2006, Chapter 3. 
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specific institutions separately. In some contexts, high unemployment benefits might raise the 
unemployment rate. In others, the existence of generous unemployment benefits might persuade 
workers and unions to accept lower levels of legal employment protection, resulting in a more, not a 
less, dynamic labor market. 
 
The rest of this section reviews the recent experience of two countries with very different 
experiences before and after the Great Recession. Denmark had what was arguably the OECD’s 
best performing labor markets before the Great Recession, but has suffered since 2008. German 
labor markets, meanwhile, were generally struggling from shortly after unification through about 
2007, when suddenly Germany began to outperform every major economy in the OECD. 
 
Denmark 
The experience of the Danish economy from the mid-1990s through the Great Recession did a great 
deal to change the consensus view on the need for labor-market “flexibility” at all costs.9 In 2007, 
just before the downturn, the Danish unemployment rate was 4.0 percent (compared to 4.6 percent 
in the United States) and the employment-to-population rate was 77.1 percent (compared to 71.8 
percent in the United States).10 Low-wage work was rare,11 and income inequality was near the 
lowest levels in the OECD.12 Yet, by OECD standards, Denmark had high taxes, high unionization 
rates, generous unemployment benefits, and a costly system of education, training, assistance, and 
incentives for unemployed workers. 
 
The Danish model – often described as being built around “flexicurity” – worked, it seems, because 
it combined a high level of “flexibility” for employers with equally high levels of “security” for 
workers. The flexibility came primarily in the form of low levels of legal employment protections 
combined with a willingness of Danish unions to accept layoffs. The security came in the form of 
high wages, strong unions, and generous unemployment insurance and other benefits.13 A defining 
Danish labor-market institution has been its collection of “active labor market policies” (ALMPs). 
These policies targeted at unemployed workers include education and training, extensive assistance 
in job search, financial incentives, subsidized employment, and, in some cases, even direct public-
sector employment. ALMPs increase flexibility by moving the unemployed through the generous 
unemployment benefits system and enhance security by improving skills and providing temporary, 
subsidized employment opportunities for workers who otherwise might spend long periods 
unemployed. 
 
From about the middle of the 1990s through the onset of the Great Recession, the system produced 
enviable results. The unemployment rate fell rapidly, from over ten percent in 1993 to under five 
percent by 2000, a range where it remained until 2008. Most accounts explain these results by 
emphasizing the way that the flexicurity institutions supported a dynamic labor market that was 
capable of rapidly reallocating workers from firms and sectors in the economy where demand was 
falling to firms and sectors where demand was on the rise.14 Politically, the system worked because 
                                                 
9 See, for example, OECD (2004, 2006) and European Commission (2006). 
10 Rate is for population ages 15 to 64; see OECD, Employment Outlook 2010, Table B. 
11  See Mason and Salverda (2010) and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008). 
12 See OECD (2011), Figure 1. 
13 The Danish unemployment insurance system is administered by the country’s unions, not the government. 
14   See OECD (2004, 2006) and European Commission (2006). 
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workers and their unions felt secure enough about their incomes to agree to only limited legal and 
negotiated job security. Employers accepted the higher taxes and an important economic role for 
unions because these were the political conditions that made the greater numerical flexibility 
possible. 
 
Figures 3 through 7 put the salient features of the Danish system into international perspective. As 
Figure 3 shows, Denmark has an exceptionally large commitment to ALMPs. The share of national 
GDP spent on ALMPs (per percentage-point of unemployment) was the highest in the OECD.15 
Using this standard measure, in 2007, before unemployment in Denmark increased, the country 
spent 0.26 percent of GDP per percentage point of unemployment – about twelve times more than 
the United States (0.02 percent of GDP per point of unemployment) and about five times more 
than Germany (0.05). 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
Expenditure on Active Labor Market Policies, 2007 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
 
 
                                                 
15 Expenditures (as a share of GDP) per percentage point of unemployment is a standard measure of the generosity of 
national ALMP programs. Using only expenditures (as a share of GDP) would exaggerate the generosity of ALMP 
programs in the case of countries with high levels of unemployment. In the case of Denmark, dividing the total 
expenditures (as a share of GDP) by the unemployment rate emphasizes that the Danish system is exceptionally 
generous – per unemployed worker. 
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One of the standard justifications for the large scale of Danish ALMPs is that they are necessary to 
ensure that the unemployed don’t get stuck in the country’s generous, union-administered, 
unemployment benefit system. The OECD data in Figure 4 support the view that unemployment 
benefits in Denmark are fairly generous by international standards. An “average” worker receives 
about 70 percent of the average wage during their initial period of unemployment, slightly less 
generous than Germany (74 percent), but more generous than the United States (58 percent).16 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Generosity of Unemployment Insurance, 2009 
 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
 
 
  
                                                 
16 The figure shows the OECD’s estimate of the (unweighted) average net replacement rate during the “initial phase of 
unemployment” for a worker at average earnings across six family types. These results are conditional on receipt of 
benefits, that is, the generosity estimate does not factor in the share of the unemployed who are eligible for and take 
up unemployment benefits. In the current downturn, take-up rates in the United States have been as high as three-
fourths; in normal times, including earlier recessions, the take-up rate in the United States is typically between one-
third and one-half. 
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Denmark is also heavily unionized. As Figure 5 shows, over 80 percent of Danish workers are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, more than in Germany (63 percent) and far above the 
level in the United States (13 percent). 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Collective Bargaining Coverage, 2007 
 
Source: OECD (2004) 
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At the same time, Denmark provides a relatively low level of legal employment protection. Figure 6 
presents an index of the strength of employment protection legislation (EPL), based on the OECD’s 
assessment of legal and bargained conditions on severance pay, advanced notification of dismissal, 
legal procedures related to unfair dismissal, and related issues. The index runs from zero (essentially 
no legal employment protections) to six (a very high level of legal employment protection). On this 
scale, Denmark (1.6) lies closer to the English-speaking economies (Ireland, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States) than it does to Germany (3.0), Sweden (2.9), 
and France (2.5), where employment protections are stronger. 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
Employment Protection Legislation, 2008 
 
Source: OECD 
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This combination of institutions performed well between the middle of the 1990s and the onset of 
the Great Recession. These same institutions, however, have not fared so well in the current 
downturn. Figure 7 compares the increase between 2007 and 2010 in the unemployment rate in 
Denmark, Germany, the United States, and Spain (the OECD country with the largest increase in 
unemployment over the period). Between 2007 and 2010, the Danish unemployment rate almost 
doubled from 4.0 to 7.8 percent, more closely tracking the experience of Spain and the United States 
than experience of Germany. 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
Change in Unemployment Rate, 2007-10 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
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Figure 8 sketches the labor-market adjustment path in Denmark between 2007 and 2009. Total 
employment and total hours worked increased about two percent between 2007 and 2008 – the 
crisis hit Denmark later than most of the rest of the OECD. Between 2008 and 2009, however, total 
employment and total hours both fell sharply. Total hours fell to about two percent below their 
2007 level, with almost all of this reduction in total hours stemming from a decline in the total 
number of workers. The Danish economy did not adjust to the labor-demand shock by lowering the 
average number of hours worked by the existing workforce, but rather, primarily by reducing the 
number of workers, with relatively small cuts in the average hours worked. In the framework 
discussed earlier, almost all of the adjustment fell on employment cuts and very little on average 
hours reductions. 
 
 
FIGURE 8 
Change in Hours and Employment, Denmark, 2007-09 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
 
 
Why did the Danish system suddenly lose its luster? One explanation is that the same institutions 
that created a dynamic labor market in good macroeconomic times acted to accelerate job loss 
during the downturn. Low dismissal costs produced dynamism when there was sufficient 
macroeconomic demand to produce full employment. But, low dismissal costs encouraged 
employers to reduce employment (rather than hours) when aggregate demand fell. Meanwhile, the 
country’s superb system of ALMPs was poorly equipped to deal with aggregate demand slumps. The 
majority of ALMPs seek to “activate” unemployed workers, by training them for or connecting 
them with available jobs. Even the best ALMPs, however, cannot connect workers to jobs if there 
are no jobs. 
 
The Danish model worked well when aggregate demand was high enough to ensure full 
employment. When the economy was operating near full employment, the main economic 
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bottlenecks were on the supply side of the labor market (labor quality, the distribution of skills, and 
location of workers relative to jobs). When the bottlenecks were on the demand side, however, 
greater numerical flexibility did little to generate employment and helped to drive unemployment up. 
A real danger for Denmark going forward is that the cyclical flaws in the model will be used to 
dismantle rather than reform these institutions. The German case suggests that a combination of 
numerical flexibility – in hours – combined with moderate legal and bargained dismissal costs can 
produce far better outcomes in downturns. This experience should inform efforts to improve the 
ability of Danish institutions to respond to future periods of slack demand. 
 
Germany 
Before the Great Recession, Germany was no one’s ideal model of labor-market performance. 
Unemployment was high, job creation was weak, and wage inequality was on the rise, primarily 
because of the sharp rise in low-wage and precarious employment that began in the mid- to late-
1990s.17 German companies were profitable and the country was a successful exporter, but the labor 
market was generally not delivering. The German labor-market’s performance since the Great 
Recession, however, has been remarkable. In 2007, before the downturn, the German 
unemployment rate was 8.7 percent (using the OECD’s internationally comparable measure, which 
differs slightly from the official German rate); by 2009, when the rest of the world was feeling the 
worst of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate in Germany had fallen to 7.5 percent. 
 
The German unemployment rate dropped because labor-market adjustment fell entirely on hours, 
not employment (or wages). Figure 9 shows the change in hours and employment between 2007 
and 2009. The contrast with Denmark is striking. The Great Recession affected both countries later 
than in the United States. But once the downturn hit, total hours fell in Germany – to about 98 
percent of 2007 levels – even as total employment remained constant. Effectively, reductions in the 
average hours worked absorbed all of the decline in labor demand in Germany. By contrast, in 
Denmark the reduction in labor demand fell strongly on total employment, with only small 
reductions in average hours worked per employee. 
 
 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of German and related European economic policy and performance and since reunification, see 
Bosch (2008), Carlin and Soskice (2009), Leschke and Watt (2010), Möller (2010), and Schettkat and Sun (2009). 
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FIGURE 9 
Change in Hours and Employment, Germany, 2007-09 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
 
 
How did Germany manage this? A key element was the German system of short-time work (STW).18 
STW programs provide part-time unemployment benefits to workers who have had their hours 
reduced in response to declines in demand for their employers’ products and services. In a 
traditional unemployment insurance program, if an employer needs to cut employment by 20 
percent in the wake of a demand shock, the employer will layoff 20 percent of workers and, 
assuming that the laid off workers individually meet eligibility requirements, these workers will 
receive unemployment insurance benefits. In an STW system, the same employer could, instead, cut 
average hours for all employees by 20 percent, and each employee (again, assuming individual 
eligibility requirements are met) would receive 20 percent of the full-time unemployment insurance 
benefit. Germany had a long-standing STW system in place before the downturn, and participation 
increased rapidly by the end of 2008.19 By 2009, Germany had one of the highest shares of its 
workforce enrolled in STW programs (see Figure 10). 
 
 
                                                 
18 For discussions of STW in Germany and elsewhere in the OECD, see Vroman and Brusentsev (2009), Cahuc and 
Carcillo (2011), Hijzen and Venn (2011), and ILO (2011). 
19 See ILO (2011), Figure 3.5. 
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FIGURE 10 
Short-Time Work, 2009 
 
Source: OECD (2010) 
 
 
STW, however, was only part of the hours adjustment in Germany. According to an analysis by 
Fuchs and colleagues of the change in the average hours worked between 2008 and 2009, STW 
accounted for about 25 percent of the decline in average hours (see Table 1).20 Employer-initiated 
reductions in working time – usually implemented through collective-bargaining agreements – were 
even more important than STW, accounting for about 40 percent of the fall in hours. Another 20 
percent of the decline in hours was due to the debiting of workers’ working-time accounts. About 
two-thirds of German companies have working-time accounts in place, where employees who work 
more than the normally scheduled number of hours (or work weekends, evenings, and holidays, or 
under other circumstances) can “bank” these hours against future hours of work.21 In the recession, 
many employers – with the agreement of workers and their unions – cut hours worked and paid 
workers out of the hours accumulated in these working-time accounts, rather than laying workers 
off. Reductions in overtime accounted for an additional 20 percent of the decline in average hours 
worked. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The original analysis is in J. Fuchs, M. Hummel, S. Klinger, E. Spitznagel, S. Wanger, and G. Zika. “Prognose 
2010/2011: Der Arbeitsmarkt schließt an den vorherigen Aufschwung an,” IAB-Kurzbericht No. 18, Nuremberg. I 
rely here on the IL0’s (2011) presentation of their findings. 
21 For a helpful discussion in English of the German system, see Fagan, Hegewisch, and Pillinger (2006). 
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TABLE 1 
Average Hours Reductions in Germany, 2008-2009 (percent)
Proportion of average hours reduction due to:   
Increased short-time work 25 
Employer-initiated reductions in working time 40 
Debiting working-time accounts 20 
Reduced overtime 20 
Source: OECD (2010) analysis of IAB (2009). 
Figures add to more than 100 percent because changes in holidays 
and two other categories increased average hours slightly. 
 
 
A review of the German experience suggests that several institutional features pushed employers to 
reduce hours rather than workers. Relatively high levels of legal employment protection (Figure 6) 
made it more expensive for firms to lay workers off than to reduce hours. Relatively high levels of 
collective-bargaining coverage (see Figure 5), combined with a union focus on job security, further 
raised the relative cost of lay-offs. The widespread presence of collective bargaining facilitated hours 
flexibility by implementing negotiated working-time banks and allowing for negotiated reductions in 
overtime and the usual work week. Together, this institutional structure gave substantial incentives 
to firms to prefer hours reductions to employment cuts, and gave workers incentives to do the same. 
 
Germany faces its own set of institutional challenges. Critics of the German response to the Great 
Recession have argued that the strong emphasis on “labor hoarding” at the firm level may mean that 
the economy is not efficiently reallocating labor from lagging firms and sectors to growing firms and 
sectors. This argument, however, assumes that the problem facing German firms in the downturn is 
their individual or industry performance, rather than an across-the-board collapse in demand. In 
some respects, though, this concern presents the mirror image of the problem facing Denmark. The 
German system, as implemented since 2008, has done an excellent job coping with a deep recession, 
but a reliance on hours adjustments alone could conceivably create efficiency problems when the 
economy is operating closer to full employment. If an individual firm is facing a long-term decline in 
demand for its output, for example, it is not likely to be socially efficient – beyond a transition 
period – to adjust to that firm-specific decline in demand by keeping workers tied to the declining 
firm. But, this kind of reasoning suggests modifying the functioning of the STW system in good 
times, so as to ensure that STW does not impede the efficient reallocation of workers across firms 
and sectors when the economy is operating near full capacity. In fact, the German STW system 
already appears to incorporate this kind of flexibility across the business cycle. Before the downturn, 
participation in STW was limited to six months, but as the economy deteriorated, the maximum 
duration of STW was expanded successively to 12, 18, and then 24 months.22  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22   See ILO (2011). 
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Some Lessons for the United States 
 
The recent experiences of Denmark and Germany provide important insight into the interplay 
between labor-market institutions and business cycles. Danish institutions – built around numerically 
flexible employment levels and strong income security for workers – appear to perform well when 
the economy is at or near full employment. In good times, the country’s expensive active labor 
market policies work to connect unemployed workers to available jobs. In a severe downturn in 
which the overwhelming cause of unemployment is a lack of aggregate demand, however, 
institutions that encourage adjustment through employment are a liability and policies that seek to 
“activate” workers are not particularly effective. Meanwhile, German institutions, which act to keep 
workers connected to their current employers, may have drawbacks when the economy is operating 
near full employment because they may discourage the efficient reallocation of workers from firms 
and industries where demand is falling to firms and industries where demand is on the rise. These 
same institutions, however, appear to have been well-suited for coping with the Great Recession 
because they encouraged firms to cut hours rather than workers, sharing the burden of the 
downturn more widely and helping firms keep their workforce in place and ready for the subsequent 
upturn. 
 
In the United States, the hours and employment response to the Great Recession looked more like it 
did in Denmark than Germany. The recession hit US labor markets slowly at first, but between 2008 
and 2009, employment and hours both fell sharply (see Figure 11). By 2009, employment was about 
four percent lower than it had been in 2007 and total hours were down almost six percent. The 
larger drop in hours than in employment implies that some of the labor-market adjustment in the 
United States fell on the average number of hours worked. Employment losses, however, still 
accounted for the large majority of the adjustment. A simple decomposition suggests that the mix of 
declines in employment and in average hours works was similar in the United States and Denmark. 
In both countries, about 30 percent of the decline in total hours was the result of a decline in 
average hours per employee and about 70 percent was the result of lower levels of employment.23  
 
                                                 
23 Between 2007 and 2009, total hours fell 5.8 percent and total employment fell 4.2 percent. The 4.2 percent decline in 
employment represents about 72 percent of the 5.8 percent decline in total hours, with about 28 percent accounted 
for by a decline in the average hours worked by the remaining workers. In Denmark, total hours fell 1.9 percent and 
total employment, 1.3 percent, implying that employment declines accounted for about 68 percent and average-hours 
declines about 32 percent of the decline in total hours. 
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FIGURE 11 
Change in Hours and Employment, US, 2007-09 
 
Source: Analysis of OECD data 
 
 
The hours decline in the United States largely reflected a rise in part-time work for economic 
reasons, reductions in overtime, and reductions in the average hours of full-time employees. Overall, 
US labor-market institutions did little to encourage firms to reduce average hours rather than 
employment levels. On the one hand, firing costs are low: the United States has the lowest level of 
employment protection (see Figure 6) and the lowest level of collective-bargaining coverage (see 
Figure 5) in the OECD. On the other hand, the structure of employer-provided benefits, particularly 
health insurance, make hours cuts a less cost-effective tool for lowering total compensation. While 
17 U.S. states operated short-time unemployment compensation programs during the Great 
Recession, take-up rates were too low to have a measureable impact on national average hours 
worked figures. At their peak, participation rates in STW programs, for example, never exceed a few 
tenths of a percent of the total US workforce (see Figure 10).24 
 
Are there any direct lessons that the United States can learn from the experience of Denmark and 
Germany? The political debate around “structural unemployment” – the idea that unemployment 
has remained high because workers lack the skills in demand in the post-recession economy25 – has 
rekindled an interest in education and training as a means to rescue the labor market in the short 
term. Yet, on a per-unemployed-worker basis, Denmark spends more than twelve times what the 
United States does to train and “activate” unemployed workers – with only moderately better 
                                                 
24 See Hijzen and Venn (2010), Figure 4. For a discussion of the limitations of existing US short-time compensation 
programs, see Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) and Hijzen and Venn (2010). 
25 For evidence against a large, permanent rise in the “natural” unemployment rate, see: Daly, Hobijn, and Valetta 
(2011), Mishel, Shierholz, and Edwards (2010), Mishel (2011), Schmitt and Warner (2011), and Weidner and Williams 
(2011). 
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outcomes since the beginning of the downturn. In general, supply-side ALMP strategies seem poorly 
suited to recessions caused by deficient demand. At least with respect to performance in an 
aggregate demand slump, the Danish system appears to emulate a lot of the least desirable features 
of the US system, including low firing costs that encourage firms to adjust to downturns by cutting 
workers rather than hours. 
 
The German response to the downturn, by contrast, suggests that labor-market institutions that 
encourage hours reductions, rather than layoffs, can spread the pain of adjustment more equitably, 
as well as act to preserve good matches between workers and firms. German institutions raise the 
cost of firing workers – through employment protection legislation and collective-bargaining 
agreements – and encourage reductions in average hours – through short-time work arrangements, 
withdrawals from collectively bargained working-time accounts, and collectively bargained 
reductions in the usual work week and overtime. 
 
Translating these lessons to the US context, however, is a challenge. Firing costs are low in the 
United States and the two main avenues for raising firing costs – employment protection legislation 
or a rapid expansion in collective bargaining – appear unlikely in the foreseeable future. Individual 
US states could expand the use of short-time work programs within their unemployment insurance 
systems, but the scale of expansion required would be substantial and would require addressing a 
host of concrete barriers that keep take-up rates low.26  
 
A federal program to subsidize temporary reductions in work hours – by giving tax credits to 
employers who implement or expand paid sick days, paid family leave, paid vacations, four-day 
workweeks, or other practices that reduce hours – instead of, or in addition to, expanding state-level 
unemployment insurance programs might also help.27 One advantage of a temporary federal tax 
break for these practices is that such a system directly targets the high cost of cutting hours relative 
to cutting workers, which has limited the take-up rate for short-time work programs in the United 
States. Even in Germany, which has high firing costs and a long-standing short-time work system, 
short-time work accounted for only about one-fourth of the decline in average hours. 
 
In labor markets, at least, the Great Recession continues. Given the political discussion around debt 
and deficits, any further macroeconomic policy response to the ongoing problems in the labor 
market seems unlikely. That leaves the United States little choice but to learn what it can from the 
labor-market experiences of other countries that are also facing the worst downturn since the Great 
Recession. Unfortunately, US labor-market institutions have fared far worse than the OECD 
average since 2007, turning any given decline in GDP into far more unemployment than almost 
every major economy in the OECD. To the extent that US policy makers have decided on any 
course of action, it appears to be, in President Obama’s words, to “win the future” by investing in 
education and training. The experience of Denmark, which won the future in the 1990s and 2000s, 
however, gives cause for caution. Education, training, and other measures to connect workers to 
jobs only work when there are jobs to be had. For the immediate future, the experience of Germany 
looks to offer a better way forward. German labor-market institutions gave employers incentives to 
spread the pain across the full workforce, with the remarkable result that the unemployment rate 
there actually fell over the course of the Great Recession. 
                                                 
26  Vroman and Brusentsev, 2009 
27  Baker (2009b, 2009c) offers a proposal along these lines. 
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